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Future quantum networks will enable long-
distance quantum key distribution (QKD) by
providing on-demand entanglement to arbitrary
combinations of users [1–4]. Paradigmatic QKD
protocols establish secure keys between pairs of
users, however when more than two parties want
to communicate, recently introduced quantum
conference quantum key agreement (CKA) pro-
tocols can drastically outperform 2-party primi-
tives in terms of resource cost [5–11]. Here we
implement a four-user quantum CKA protocol
using polarisation-encoded Greenberger-Horne-
Zeilinger (GHZ) entangled states generated by
high-brightness, telecom photon-pair sources. We
distribute these states over fibre connections of
up to 50km length and implement custom multi-
party error correction and privacy amplification
on the resulting raw keys. From a finite-key
analysis, we establish an information-theoretic
secure key of up to 1.15 × 106 bits, which is
used to encrypt and securely share an image
between the four users. Surpassing the pre-
vious maximum distance for GHZ state trans-
mission [12] by more than an order of magni-
tude, these results demonstrate the viability of
network protocols relying on multi-partite en-
tanglement. Future applications beyond quan-
tum CKA include entanglement-assisted remote
clock-synchronization [13, 14], quantum secret
sharing [15], and GHZ-based repeater proto-
cols [16].
Conference key agreement is a multi-user protocol for
sharing a common information-theoretic secure key be-
yond the two-party paradigm [5]. This key allows group-
wide encryption for authenticated users to communicate
securely, wherein exclusively members of the group can
decrypt messages broadcast by any other member. The
canonical approach to distribute a conference key is to
iterate two-party QKD (2QKD) primitives to establish
secret keys between pairs of users in the group, fol-
lowed by an additional bitwise XOR operation per pair of
users transforming the unique keys into a common secret
† These two authors contributed equally.
key [17, 18]. An alternative approach is to share genuine
multi-partite GHZ-entangled states [7, 8] between users
of the group, enabling the direct extraction of the con-
ference key without requiring this additional step. Re-
markably, quantum CKA can outperform 2QKD when
N users are arranged within some general network with
constrained channel capacity and quantum routers [7–
11]. Furthermore, quantum network coding schemes [4]
allow the distillation of a shared N-user GHZ state from a
single network use, reducing the resource cost—and thus
increasing the key rate—achievable in quantum CKA by
a factor (N-1) [7] when compared with distilling the re-
quired number of 2QKD key pairs.
Here we experimentally demonstrate the salient fea-
tures of the N-BB84 protocol introduced in [8] with a
state-of-the-art photonic platform. An untrusted quan-
tum server prepares and distributes L rounds of the
maximally entangled GHZ state, |GHZ〉 ≡ (|0〉⊗N +
|1〉⊗N )/√2, to N participants in the network. In our
work we implement a four-party protocol consisting of:
Alice (A), Bob 1 (B1), Bob 2 (B2), and Bob 3 (B3),
see Fig. 1 (a). Each user performs quantum mea-
surements on their respective photon in either the Z-
basis {|0〉, |1〉} constituting type-1 rounds, or the X-basis
{|+〉 .= (|0〉 + |1〉)/√2, |−〉 .= (|0〉 − |1〉)/√2} for type-2
rounds. Type-1 rounds are used to obtain the raw key
as these measurements ensure all users in the protocol
obtain the same bit value, in the absence of noise, ow-
ing to the structure of the GHZ state. Type-2 rounds
are carried out randomly with probability p, for a total
of m = L · p rounds, and are used to detect the pres-
ence of an eavesdropper. Users coordinate the measure-
ment sequence using L · h (p) bits of a pre-shared key. In
particular, one user generates the L-bit string indicating
the measurement type of each round. The string can be
classically compressed, shared, and decompressed by the
other parties. Note that the values of p are typically on
the order of 0.02, leading to a small value of h(p), i.e.,
the amount of information to be initially pre-shared is
small.
Once the measurements are complete, users proceed
to verify the security of their key by performing pa-
rameter estimation. All users announce their outcomes
for a subset of the type-1 rounds, m in total and ran-
domly chosen, and all m type-2 rounds to determine
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FIG. 1. (a) Quantum conference key agreement scheme. A quantum server distributes entangled GHZ states to Alice,
who initiates the protocol, and Bobs 1, 2, and 3. They establish a common key from a pre-agreed sequence of Z measurements
while checking the security by measuring X. (b) Experimental setup. A mode-locked picosecond laser (ti:sapph) multiplexed
to 320MHz repetition rate supplies two entangled photon sources which are based on parametric downconversion in periodically
poled KTP crystals (PPKTP), pumped bidirectionally in a Sagnac loop for producing polarisation-entangled Bell pairs [19].
Down-converted photons are separated from the pump with dichroic mirrors (DM) and coupled into fibres (FC). One photon
from each source non-classically interfere on a polarising beamsplitter (PBS) creating the four-photon GHZ state, see Methods
for details. Each user receives their photon via single-mode fibres and performs projective measurements in the Z(X) basis by
using a quarter- (QWP) and half-wave plate (HWP), and a polarising beamsplitter (PBS) before detection with superconducting
nanowire single-photon detectors (SNSPD). Detection events are time-tagged and counted in coincidence within a 1 ns time
window.
QmABi =
(
1− 〈σAz σBiz 〉) /2 for i = {1, 2, 3} and QmX =(
1− 〈σ⊗4x 〉) /2 respectively. We define the quantum bit
error rate (QBER) as QBERm .= max QmABi . All users
retain n = L − 2m bits forming the raw conference key,
subsequently corrected with an error correction scheme
and shortened with privacy amplification to ensure secu-
rity. Finally, all users remove L · h (p) bits from their se-
cret conference key to encode the pre-shared keys for sub-
sequent protocols. Hence, our protocol is a key-growing
routine, as in any known QKD scheme.
In our experiment, see Fig. 1(b), we employ
two high-brightness, polarisation-entangled photon-pair
sources [19] at telecommunication wavelength (1550 nm).
We generate four-photon GHZ states by non-classically
interfering one photon from each source on a PBS, which
has success probability of 1/2 (see for example [20]
or Methods for details). We use commercially avail-
able superconducting nanowire single-photon detectors
(SNSPDs) with typical quantum efficiencies of > 80% at
this wavelength.
We establish the upper bound on the performance of
our protocol by assuming an infinite number of rounds
can be performed, L → ∞. In this asymptotic regime
nearly all rounds are used to extract the raw key, p→ 0.
We evaluate the asymptotic key rate (AKR) as the frac-
tion of secret bits, `, extracted from the total rounds [8]:
AKR =
`
L
= 1− h(QX)− h(QBER) , (1)
where h(x) = −x log2 x−(1−x) log2(1−x) is the Shannon
entropy. From Eq. 1 we note the AKR depends only on
the noise parameters QX and QBER. We estimate these
parameters experimentally using a large sample size of
type-1 and type-2 measurements to minimise uncertain-
ties. The results are shown in Fig. 2.
We denote the network topology as {d1, d2, d3}, where
di is the fibre length in kilometres between Bi and the
server. Alice remains fixed at 2m from the server in all
cases. We implement four scenarios: {0, 0, 0}, {0, 0, 20},
{0, 10, 20}, and {20, 10, 20}, corresponding to measured
network losses (in dB) of 0, 4.84, 7.57, and 11.77. The
observed four-photon generation rates gR for these sce-
narios are 40.89Hz, 12.68Hz, 6.31Hz, and 2.03Hz. In
addition, for the finite-key analysis only, we consider a
fifth asymmetric scenario {5, 10, 20}. The conference key
rate is determined as a product of the fractional AKR
and the recorded generation rates gR. In all cases we
observe similar noise parameters, and thus AKR, indi-
cating that the entanglement quality is not degraded sig-
nificantly by the transmission fibres. The experimental
AKR is mainly limited by multiple-pair generations at
the sources and by spectral impurities of the photons,
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FIG. 2. Asymptotic key rate results. (top) We determine
the fractional asymptotic key rate (AKR) by measuring QX
and QBER without performing the full protocol. We evaluate
AKR for a range of loss conditions set by the placement of
fibre links in the network. (bottom) The conference key rate
is plotted as a function of the total fibre length in the network.
We include results of the generation rates with measurement-
basis switching using our implementation, see Methods for
details.
see Supplementary Information (SI) for details. To the
best of our knowledge, our work demonstrates for the
first time the distribution of 1550 nm four-qubit entan-
gled state in long telecom fibres, proving the viability of
polarisation-encoded photons to remain highly entangled
over long distances.
We also include the adjusted conference key rates when
we perform the protocol with actively switched measure-
ment bases. In our experiment, this is accomplished by
rotating wave plates with motorised stages that are slow
compared to the clock rate of our sources. As such, this
leads to a reduced overall rate as shown in Fig. 2 (see
Methods for details).
Our N-BB84 implementation operates at low rates and
a complete finite-key analysis, where a fractional secret
key rate (SKR) is adjusted to take into account finite
statistics from parameter estimation, is crucial. For our
experiment, we determine the optimal fraction of type-
2 measurements to be p = m/L = 0.012. With this
value of p, the amount of information reserved for the
pre-shared key is h(p) = 0.093, see Methods for more
details. Moreover, we set a total security parameter i.e.
the maximal probability that an eavesdropper gains non-
zero information about the key to be 1.8 × 10−8, see SI
for details. We implement the protocol in an asymmetric
fibre network {5, 10, 20} with a measured loss of 9.53 dB
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FIG. 3. (a) Finite key results. We implement all steps in
the N-BB84 protocol for a range of L rounds to retrieve the
final key of length ` and evaluate the secret key rate, SKR =
`/L. In our experiment we employ LDPC codes with fixed
code rates, r, using the estimated QBER in each run. We
implement privacy amplification using Toeplitz matrices, then
remove a portion of the final key for the pre-shared bits used
to encode the measurement rounds. The upper bound given
by Eq. 5 is shown compared with the experimental data. (b)
Encryption. We generate an tot-secure conference key of
1.15×106 bits. Using 1.06×106 bits, Alice encrypts an image
(8-bit RGB, 280 by 158 pixels) employing a one-time-pad-
like scheme. Alice sends the encrypted image over a public
channel allowing only Bob 1, Bob 2, and Bob 3, who share
the conference key, to decode the image.
in total. We obtain over 4.09 × 106 type-1 rounds and
5.01× 104 type-2 rounds during 177 hours of continuous
measurement. Due to the long measurement time active
polarisation feedback was implemented to minimise noise
owing to thermal drifts in the laboratory (see Methods
for details). Once the raw key is distilled by all users,
we implement one-way error correction using low-density
parity-check (LDPC) codes complying with the Digital
Video Broadcasting (DVB-S2) standard [21]. The code
was adapted to our multi-party scenario, simultaneously
correcting Bob 1, Bob 2, and Bob 3 keys. This step en-
sures that all parties share a common key, however it
remains partly secret owing to information leaked during
error correction, and any potential eavesdropping during
the distribution step. In order to reduce the information
held by any potential eavesdropper, we implement one
round of privacy amplification on the entire raw key, re-
4ducing its final length. We use Toeplitz matrices for this
purpose, a class of universal-2 hash functions [22] that
can be implemented efficiently for our given key size.
We estimate the theoretical performance of our post-
processing steps by evaluating the noise parameters
QX = 0.05 and QBER = 0.0159, which we use to calcu-
late the upper bound set by Eq. 5 in the Methods section
and plotted in Fig 3(a) (dashed line). When performing
the protocol in earnest with a finite data set to estimate
these parameters, we replace the Shannon limit for the
error correction term h(QBERm+2ξz) in Eq. 5 with the
fraction of parity bits disclosed by Alice.
Finally, we use the secret conference key to encrypt
an image of a Cheshire cat that is shared between the
parties in a brief conference call (Fig. 3b).
The security of our protocol is based on the proof
in [8] and the assumptions therein. We note that Al-
ice’s measurement device is trusted whereas Bobs’ mea-
surement devices can be untrusted, as long as the detec-
tors are memoryless. Adapting the quantum conference-
key agreement protocol for full (measurement-)device-
independence is a work in progress, see for example [23,
24].
Experimental 2QKD key rates are bounded by the the
well-known repeaterless bound [25] established for point-
to-point rates. We remark that this bound does not ap-
ply to our scenario, where four users are connected to
a common server according to some network topology.
New bounds were recently found if repeaters are intro-
duced in a chain-like network [26] showing that higher
key-rates can in principle be achieved. As our scenario
omits repeaters these new bounds do not hold either,
however we might expect similar improvements in the
maximum key rates as opposed to standard end-to-end
2QKD protocols. An accurate model for fundamental
bounds in a general network to apply to our scenario is
still missing. We study this briefly in the SI, highlighting
the non-trivial conference key rate dependence on asym-
metric distribution of noise in the network.
Our post-processing, Fig. 3, is currently based on one-
way LDPC error correction. The well-known two-way
CASCADE protocol [27] outperforms the optimal LDPC
approach in two-party QKD for small QBER [28], how-
ever, in the multi-user case this improvement will likely
be offset by the additional iterations needed to correct
uncorrelated errors in (N − 1) raw keys. In contrast,
LDPC codes disclose a fixed amount of information that
depends only on the largest QBER between Alice and any
of the Bobs in the network. To the best of our knowl-
edge, no proof exists for the optimal strategy to achieve
the minimal bit disclosure rate when implementing error
correction in the multi-user QKD scenario, and we leave
this as an open question for future work.
Experimentally, future steps will be directed towards
GHZ rate increases, the extension to more conference
parties, and field tests in established fibre networks [29].
For direct GHZ-state transmission as demonstrated here,
quantum CKA scales unfavourably with the number of
users due to the exponential reduction in multi-photon
detection considering unavoidable transmission losses.
However, loss will not be a problem in fully-featured
quantum networks where CKA will retain its significant
(N-1) rate advantage.
METHODS
Entangled photon source
We produce photon-pairs using Type-II collinear spon-
taneous parametric down conversion (SPDC) imple-
mented in a 22mm long periodically-poled KTP (PP-
KTP) crystal. Both of our sources are optically pumped
using a mode-locked laser operating with a nominal rep-
etition rate of 80MHz, 1.4 ps pulses and its central wave-
length at 774.9 nm. A passive pulse interleaver is used to
quadruple the 80MHz pulse train to 320MHz [30]. The
PPKTP crystals are embedded within a polarisation-
based Sagnac interferometer [19] and pumped bidi-
rectionally, using a half-wave plate to set diagonally-
polarised light, to create polarisation-entangled photons
at 1549.8 nm in the approximate state:
|ψ−〉 = 1√
2
(|h〉|v〉 − |v〉|h〉) , (2)
which we can map to any Bell state via local operation
on one of the two photons.
With loose bandpass filters of 3 nm bandwidth, we
measure an average source brightness of ∼ 4100
pairs/mW/s, with a symmetric heralding efficiency of
∼ 60% [31]. The average heralding efficiency reduces by
∼ 12% with a commensurate decrease of 45% in source
brightness at the point of detection of the four users at
zero distance. We characterise each photon pair source by
performing quantum state tomography, reconstructing
density matrices using maximum-likelihood estimation
and Monte-Carlo simulations based on Poissonian count
statistics to determine errors. For each source we obtain a
typical two-photon Bell-state fidelity F = 95.58± 0.15%
and purity P = 92.07 ± 0.27%, while entanglement is
measured by concurrence C = 92.38± 0.21%.
The four-photon GHZ state is created by interfering
one photon from each source on a polarising beamsplitter
(PBS), which transmits horizontally and reflects verti-
cally polarised photons. Post-selecting on the case where
one photon is emitted in each output, which occurs with
a probability of 1/2, we obtain the state
|GHZ〉 = 1√
2
(|hhhh〉 − |vvvv〉) , (3)
where |h〉 ≡ |0〉 and |v〉 ≡ |1〉 represent horizontal and
vertical polarisations respectively. We measure indepen-
5dent two-photon interference visibility of 92.96 ± 0.95%
using 100mW pump power, and four-qubit state tomog-
raphy returns a purity and fidelity of P = 81.39± 0.83%
and F = 87.58± 0.48% respectively.
Active switching
Most QKD protocols require random switching of the
measurement basis, either passively or actively, with each
clock cycle. The same holds for the N-BB84 protocol,
where users switch between the Z/X measurement bases
according to a pre-agreed random sequence. Since all
users implement the same measurement sequence, passive
switching is not an option.
As noted, p is typically small hence switching be-
tween bases occurs relatively infrequently. In addition
the multi-photon detection rates in our experiment are
low, hence the standard method of polarisation switch-
ing with electro-optic modulators would be excessive. We
therefore implemented active switching using motorised
rotation stages with switching speeds on the order of
seconds—marginally slower than our average required
switching periods, which reduces the maximum possible
raw generation rate gR.
We evaluate the adjusted generation rate g′R for the fi-
nite key scenario for the {5, 10, 20} topology, by perform-
ing 1000 rounds of the protocol with active basis switch-
ing. We set p = 0.02, thus 20 type-2 rounds are randomly
allocated in the measurement sequence. We measured
the reduced key generation rate and found g′R/gR = 0.91.
This adjustment ratio is rate dependent. We find the
lower bound on g′R by assuming the type-2 rounds are
never sequential hence each occurrence requires time to
switch. This leads to the general expression,
g′R ≥
1
τsp+
1−p
gR
, (4)
where τs is the switching speed. We use this equation to
extrapolate the adjusted generation rates obtained in the
asymptotic case as shown by orange dots in Fig. 2.
Active polarisation control
The optical fibre links in our experiment are realised
by spools of bare SMF28 fibre. Thermal drifts in the
laboratory introduces unwanted rotations in polarisation
which, if uncorrected, leads to added noise in the pro-
tocol. These effects are typically negligible for short fi-
bre lengths, e.g., in our testing we found the 5 km spool
added no observable noise greater than with a 2m fibre
link, while the 10 km and 20 km spools showed significant
added noise in QABi measurements.
We implement active polarisation control to correct
for these effects during key transmission to preserve low-
noise operation throughout the protocol. The feedback
control loop is implemented by performing single-qubit
tomography in each fibre to characterise the unitary
transformation on the polarisation qubits. We then use
the polarisation optics in the measurement stages to undo
the rotations on the qubits and perform measurements
in the required basis. In our setup we carry out one-
qubit tomography of all four fibre links simultaneously,
including post-processing, to obtain an estimate of the
unitary operation and implement the corrective action
on the motorised waveplates. This takes less than 30
seconds and is performed once every ∼ 20 minutes for an
optimal tradeoff between maintaining a high duty-cycle
while minimising bit error rates.
Error correction using LDPC codes
The use of LDPC codes allows one party to initialise
the routine by encoding a block of k raw bits into a j-bit
codeword using a H(j−k)×j parity check matrix, where
the ratio r = k/j defines the code rate which in principle
can be any number from 0 to 1. The DVB-S2 standard
provides H matrices already computed for a set of differ-
ent code rates specified for a codeword size of j = 64′800
bits. In our experiment, we set the code rate according
to the estimated QBER using m samples with appropri-
ate ξZ correction. From the provided set of code rates
we used 1/2, 1/3 and 1/4 for small, mid and large values
of L as shown in Fig. 3(a). Alice uses the parity matrix
to calculate the parity check bits, then sends to all par-
ties the parity check bits and the H matrix through an
authenticated classical channel. Each Bob implements a
decoding algorithm consisting of simple addition, com-
parison and table look-up operations. The codes used
here have been modified from MatLAB communication
packages based on the DVB-S2 standards [21]. The num-
ber of parity bits communicated during EC is discarded
to ensure security of the final conference key.
Finite-key conference rate
When using a finite number of rounds, the estimated
parameters QmX and QBER from the m type-2 and type-
1 rounds, are affected by statistical error which must be
taken into account in the final key rate. The fractional
6key rate is given by,
`
L
=
n
L
[1− h(QmX + 2ξX)
− h(QBERm + 2ξZ)]− log2
[
2(N − 1)
EC
] 1
L
− 2 log2
[
1− 2(N − 1)PE
2PA
] 1
L
− h(p) ,
(5)
where N is number of users in the protocol, (ξX , ξZ) are
finite-key correction terms and (EC , PE , PA) set the
security parameters of our protocol, see SI for further
details. The final term in Eq. 5 is the portion of the final
key removed after PA, to account for the preshared key
used in marking the type-2 rounds.
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7SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION
Experimental Noise
As outlined in the main text, for the state employed
in the protocol as in Eq. (3), we expect QX = 0 and
QBER = 0. However, in the experimental implemen-
tation, the values observed are always non-zero. In our
setup as in Fig. 1, the dominant sources of noise come
from high-order generations in the PDC process and im-
perfect mode-matching at the PBS. A comprehensive
model to account the effects of the noise on the expected
value of QX and QBER, is non-trivial and goes beyond
the scope of this work. However, we provide some quali-
tative remarks and suggestions for improvements.
Due to the probabilistic nature of the PDC process,
there is always a non-zero probability that more than a
single pair is generated within the crystal embedded in
the Sagnac interferometer. This effect can be quantita-
tively accounted for by the so-called signal-to-noise ra-
tio (SNR), defined as the ratio of single-pair events over
the multiple-pair events. Note that increasing the pump
power decreases the SNR. As shown in Fig. S1, both QX
and QBER depend indeed from the pump power. The
dependence is well fit by a linear trend, at least within
the power range we considered. Note that for the data
shown represents the setup initially, which was later op-
timised for our experiments hence the values shown here
are slightly greater than those reported in the main text
at 100mW. Importantly, whereas the QBER tends to
0 in the limit of power → 0, the QX does not. Quali-
tatively, this can be understood from the fact that the
QBER only depends on the polarisation of the photons
in the state in Eq. (3), and not on their coherence. On
the other hand, the value of QX is directly affected by
the amount of coherence in the GHZ state considered for
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FIG. S1. QX and QBER as a function of power. Within
the range of power considered, the trend is linear although
the slope for the QBER is greater than the slope for QX .
Moreover, QX is lower-bounded by the value of 0.05 at zero-
power.
the protocol. In turn, the state’s coherence is influenced
by all the degrees of freedom, i.e.: polarisation, photon-
number, time and spectrum. Decreasing the power –
therefore increasing the SNR– only affects the purity in
the photon-number degree of freedom but cannot affect
the other degrees of freedom. In particular, although our
photons are spectrally filtered at the source, they retain
some spectral mixture intrinsic to the PDC process. This
leads to non-ideal interference at the PBS, and therefore
to a non-zero lower bound for the measurable QX . Such
lower bound can be linked to the experimentally mea-
sured visibility as following. Assuming that the photons
at the PBS successfully interfere with some probability
t, we can write the state ρo after the interference as:
ρo = tρs + (1− t)ρf . (S1)
Where ρs is the density matrix of the state in case of
success, given by ρs = |GHZ〉〈GHZ|, and ρf is the den-
sity matrix in case of failure given by (|hhhh〉〈hhhh| +
|vvvv〉〈vvvv|)/2. The expected QX for this state is
QX =
1− Tr[ρo ⊗X⊗4]
2
=
1− t
2
(S2)
Note that for t = 1, QX = 0, and for t = 0, QX = 1/2.
Similarly, given the experimentally measured visibility
Vexp we expect QX = 0 and QX = 1/2 for Vexp = 1 and
Vexp = 0 respectively. We can thus, at least for these two
extreme cases, interpret t as Vexp. Assuming that t ≈
Vexp in general, we have that for Vexp = 0.9, QX = 0.05
in accordance with our results (see main text). It should
be noted however, that the interference at the PBS is a
coherent process, which might not be fully characterised
by the simple model just presented. Hence, in general,
we can conclude that QX & (1− Vexp)/2.
Security parameters in NBB84
As stated in the main text, Eq. (5) represents the
achievable secret key rate of the NBB84 protocol when
the parties perform a finite number of rounds L. In other
words, Alice needs to set the length of the PA output to
Eq. (5) in order to ensure that the established key is
secure with security parameter tot. The security param-
eter tot represents the maximal probability that a poten-
tial eavesdropper gains at least some information about
the established key. It is related to the failure proba-
bilities of the different stages of the protocol as follows:
tot = EC + PA +2PE , where EC is the maximal fail-
ure probability of the EC procedure and PA represents
the same in the case of PA, while the last term is related
to the failure probability of the PE step. In particular,
the observed values QmABi and Q
m
X in the 2m rounds de-
voted to PE might differ from the correspondent values
QnABi and Q
n
X characterizing the remaining n = L− 2m
8rounds which are used to extract the secret key. The de-
viation of QnABi and Q
n
X is quantified by the theory of
random sampling without replacement [32] and must be
accounted for in the secret key rate Eq. (5), by taking
the worst-case in order to preserve security. As shown
in Ref. [8], the distance |QnABi −QmABi | (|QnX −QmX |) be-
tween the pairwise bit discordance (the parameter QnX)
and its observed value is not larger than 2ξZ (2ξX) with
probability at least 1− Z (1− X), where:
ξZ,X =
√
(n+m)(m+ 1)
8nm2
ln
(
1
Z,X
)
. (S3)
By combining the above statements one can deduce that:
Pr
[
QnX ≤ QmX + 2ξX ∧ QnABi ≤ QmABi + 2ξZ ∀i
]
≥ 1− 2PE , (S4)
where we defined the total PE failure probability 2PE as
follows:
2PE ≡ (N − 1)Z + X . (S5)
Note that the probabilities Z and X , and hence 2PE ,
can be chosen freely as to maximize the resulting secret
key rate, with the only constraint that: PE ≤ tot. In-
deed, in our experiment we maximize the key rate in
Eq. (5) over the failure probabilities Z , X , EC and PA
and over the fraction of type-2 rounds p, having fixed the
security parameter to tot = 1.8×10−8 and using prelim-
inary estimations for QBER and QX . We obtain optimal
values: p = 0.012, EC ∼ 10−13 and PA ∼ 10−10. The
optimal value for p is then used to establish the fraction
of type-2 measurements that need to be performed dur-
ing data collection. We remark that since EC and PA
possess an operational meaning as described above, one
needs to verify that the actual procedures implemented
for EC and PA fail at most with probabilities 10−13 and
10−10, respectively. Due to the lack of a quantitative
estimation of the failure probability characterizing the
procedures adopted for EC and PA in our experiment,
we could not verify that they are below the stated val-
ues. Nevertheless, we confirm that both procedures never
failed in all the instances where they were used.
For further details, we refer the reader to Ref. [8].
Topology dependence in a conference key scenario
Conversely from the standard Alice-Bob scenario, con-
ference key protocols are performed over a network where
different users are connected according to some topology,
and each link might be some noisy quantum channel.
Therefore, in general, the conference key rates might de-
pend on the noise distribution in the network opening a
new problem absent in 2QKD.
FIG. S2. Plot of QX as a function of the noise parameters pB1
and pB2 characterising the depolarising channels (Eq. S7) of
Bob 1 and Bob 2, respectively. The noise parameter of Bob 3
is fixed to: pB3 = 1.5− pB1 − pB2. We also insert the vector
field of the gradient of QX with respect to pB1 and pB2.
Here, we study the 4-party network considered in the
main text i.e. four users connected to one common server,
with the noise affecting each link modeled as a depolar-
ising channel
D(ρ) = (1− 3p
4
)I + p
3
(XρX + Y ρY + ZρZ) (S6)
Therefore, in general we can assume the channels of Alice,
Bob 1, Bob 2 and Bob 3 to have noise parameters pA, pB1,
pB2, and pB3, respectively. For simplicity, we consider
the case where Alice’s channel is noiseless pA = 0 as
the results are qualitatively the same. In this case, the
expressions of QX and QABi, for a depolarised 4-qubit
GHZ state with noise parameters pB1, pB2 and pB3, are
QX(pB1, pB2, pB3) =
[(pB1 − 1) (pB2 − 1) (pB3 − 1) + 1]
2
QABi(pBi) =
pBi
2
(S7)
QX depends on the noise parameters of all the chan-
nels, whereas QABi only depends locally on the noise
parameter affecting the link connecting Alice and Bi. Of
course, both functions have a global minimum in (pB1,
pB2, pB3) = (0, 0, 0), that is when all the channels are
noiseless.
What is interesting to study is whether both the func-
tions have a minimum with the constraint pB1 + pB2 +
pB3 = c where c is a constant in the interval c ∈ [0, 3].
In practice, this corresponds to fix some total amount of
noise strength c on the network and finding which solu-
tion gives the highest key rate i.e. the lowest QX and
QABi. It is straightforward to see that the minimum
of maxiQABi is given by pB1 = pB2 = pB3 = c/3. To
find the minimum of QX , we compute the gradient of
9f(pB1, pB2) = QX(pB1, pB2, c− pB1 − pB2)
∂f(pB1, pB2)
∂pB1
=
1
2
(pB2 − 1)(c− 2pB1 − pB2)) (S8)
∂f(pB1, pB2)
∂pB2
=
1
2
(pB1 − 1)(c− pB1 − 2pB2)) (S9)
The plot in Fig. S2 shows the function f(pB1, pB2) for
c = 1.5 with at the bottom the vector field of the gradi-
ent as given by ∇f . One can verify that the minimum
of the function is in pB1 = pB2 = pB3 = c/3, therefore
we conclude that the maximum conference key rate is
achievable when the noise is symmetrically spread over
the network. This result intuitively reflects the symme-
try of the GHZ state, however in practice we can never
assume the same amount of noise in all the channels.
Nevertheless, it is important to note that the function is
quite flat around the minimum. It follows that for small
deviations from the symmetric configuration the effect on
the key rate could be neglected. We leave open for inves-
tigation similar studies that account for different noise
models.
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